In 1989, Culter, Poterba and Summers (1989) published a paper examining the extent to which ex-post movements in aggregate stock prices could be attributed to the arrival of news. The research was motivated by Richard Roll's (1988) presidential address to the American Finance Association in which he concluded that only about a third of the variation in market indicies could be attributed to economic influences. As part of their research, Cutler, Poterba and Summers examined the fifty largest one-day returns on the S&P 500 index over the period from 1946 through 1987. They found that many of the fifty largest movements in the S&P 500 could not be matched with any convincing account of why future profits or discount rates might have changed.
Consequently, the authors concluded that, "Our inability to identify fundamental shocks that accounted for these significant market moves is difficult to reconcile with the view that such shocks account for most of the variation in stock returns."
Studying large market movements is particularly interesting because news important enough to account for a major swing in aggregate stock prices should make it way into media reports in one way or another. This is particularly true for the more recent sample analyzed here. Since the time when Cutler, Poterba and Summers published their work, stock market reporting has expanded dramatically. Whereas major publishers like the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal covered the market during the years from 1946 to 1987, by the end of the technology stock boom in 2000 there were hundreds of internet sites that focused on the stock market and entire television networks had sprung up offering real time market punditry. In fact, one of the biggest problems in doing the research for this paper was separating the wheat from the chaff. Following major market moves today, there are typically dozens of explanations, most of them clearly half baked, and virtually none of them relating the explanation for the move to changes in expected future profits or discount rates.
Overall, the results reported here confirm the findings of Cutler, Poterba and Summers. Despite the passage of time and the massive improvement in information technology, it is, if anything, more difficult to tie major stock price movements to fundamental economic news sufficient to rationalize the size of the observed move.
Furthermore, the tendency to use tautological psychology, such as "the market fell today on renewed fears of recession or because of panic selling," to explain large movements in prices (a problem noted by Cutler, Poterba and Summers) has become even more prevalent. The bottom line is that the source of large movements in overall market prices remains as much of mystery today as when Cutler, Poterba and Summers published their paper in 1989.
Data Empirical results
As opposed to the S&P 500, I use the broader CRSP value weighted index covering all New York, American and NASDAQ stocks to measure market movements.
Daily returns for the CRSP index were downloaded and sorted by absolute value over the twenty-five year period from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 2012. For comparison with Cutler, Poterba and Summers, it should be noted that the CRSP index had a slightly smaller standard deviation than the S&P 500 during the sample period, so holding everything else constant the 50 largest moves should be slightly smaller in my sample.
The sorted returns are reported in Table 1 followed by the related news for the day. The news stories were selected from the database maintained by Factiva. In most instances, the market report was based on information Factiva accumulated from the Dow Jones News Service. As a check, the reporting of the Dow Jones News Service was confirmed with other sources.
The impact of a news story depends not only on the importance of the news, but the extent to which the story was anticipated. For instance, the government seizure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 6, 2008 has all the earmarks of an important event, but the market return on that day does not rank among the top fifty, presumably because the bankruptcy was largely anticipated by the time it occurred. On the other hand, there are events that also should have been anticipated, but nonetheless made the list. For instance, the downgrade of the U.S. Government credit rating on August 8, 2011
followed weeks of speculation that such a downgrade was imminent. Therefore, even if an unexpected downgrade of the United States would have been significant news, a largely expected downgrade should not have been.
A number of interesting conclusion emerge from Table 1. The first, and most basic, is that the data presented in the table are consistent with the earlier findings of Cutler, Poterba and Summers. With a few exceptions, such as such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the decision by governments throughout the world to support troubled banks on October 13, 2008, it is hard to conceive how the news arriving on the day in question led to revaluation of the entire market value of U.S. equity on the order of five to ten percent. On the days, when there is no fundamental economic news which could reasonably be said to have caused the drop, the financial media typically would offer a tautological explanations for the movement based on unverifiable psychological factors. The reason for this apparently being that the media believes that major market moves require some explanation. For instance, on August 31, 1998 stocks allegedly crashed on "fears" of turmoil in Russia and "doubts" about Asia. A more common response was to mix fundamental news with psychological explanations without connecting the two. For example, on October 22, 2008, it was reported that "Recession fears overwhelmed world stock markets today as a number of large companies reported weak earnings in the third quarter and forecast worse to come."
It is interesting to note that these psychological explanations invariably overlooked the fact that for every buyer there is a seller. Furthermore, in not one instance was a psychological explanation tied to shifts in long-run expectations regarding cash flows and discount rates. The apparent media viewpoint was that readers and viewers require an explanation for a major market move, but do not require that the explanation be tied to the underlying economics in any meaningful fashion.
Second, the results reported in Table 1 indicate that rather than ameliorating since the publication of Cutler, Poterba and Summers, large movements in the market have become even more common. Comparing Table 1 item by item with the comparable table   from Cutler, Poterba and Summers reveals that except for two days associated with the crash of October 1987, the percentage change for a given rank, such as the 10 th largest, is universally greater for the current sample than the earlier one. In fact, the smallest of the 50 market movements reported in Table 1 would have ranked 18 th on Cutler, Poterba and Summers' list. This results hold despite the fact that the CRSP index was slightly less volatile than the S&P 500 during the current sample period.
A third curious feature is the extent to which the large returns are bunched. Some bunching is expected because numerous previous studies have found that the volatility of stock prices is persistent, but the extent of the bunching is surprising. 
Conclusions and implications
The results reported here largely mirror those published more than two decades ago by Cutler, Poterba and Summers. Despite the explosion in information technology, enhanced market regulation, innovation in stock trading and the introduction of new equity related financial products, large movements in the market remain as common and mysterious as ever. Only a minority of the 50 largest moves in the last 25 years can be tied to fundamental economic information that could have had a pronounced impact on cash flow forecasts or discount rates. If anything, the mystery has deepened because the size of the unexplained market movements has grown.
The most significant difference between the current results and those of Cutler, Poterba and Summers is that the large changes are more bunched in the current sample. The market experienced the largest post election drop ever on the reported contraction of 157,000 jobs in October.
31 Saturday, August 04, 2001 -5.03%
A slowdown in number of job losses to 42,000 and unchanged unemployment of 4.5 pecent indicated that economic deterioration might be turning into stagnation. The report led some investors to think this might discourage the Federal Reserve from continuing its aggressive campaign of cutting interest rates in an effort to avoid a recession. Bullish comments from executives in bellwether tech companies and a much better-than-expected reading on the U.S. service sector fueled speculation that the U.S. economy and corporate profits are on a faster track to recovery than once estimated.
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Thursday, August 18, 2011 -4.53%
Jobless claims rose 9,000 more than expected. Existing home sales dropped 3.5% in July more than the expected 2.0%. Inflation jumped 0.5% compared to expected 0.2%. Morgan Stanley put out a dismal forecast for the globlal economy. Asian stock markets extended their drop Tuesday amid renewed fears of deepening global recession. U.S. stocks declined after Geithner's bank rescue plan received a weak reception.
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Thursday, August 11, 2011 4.52%
All three indexes surged about 4% on positive corporate earnings and positive labor market news. The Commerce Department released its July retail sales report, exceeding expectations. The report showed that retail sales rose 0.5%.
